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        UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UNDER 
        THE TRADE UNION LAW OF JAPAN 
                     By SHINICHI KIMURA 
                 Assistant Professor f Law, OsakaUniversity 
I 
   In Japan, the Trade Union Law of 1949 now remains in practice, and 
Article 7 and 27 of the said Law provide for the prohibition of unfair labor 
practices and the procedures for solving them. At the time when the old 
Trade Union Law of 1945 was amended in 1949, the present system of unfair 
labor practices was adopted, modelling after the Wagner Act of America (the 
National Labor Relations Act). According to the Law of 1949, a certain 
specified acts of an employer are prohibited as unfair labor practices, just 
in the same manner as in case of the Wagner Act. When there are offensive 
acts on the part of the employer, the employees may be allowed to resort to 
a legal measure for the relief against the employer after going through a certain 
fixed procedure. For this purpose, the Labor Relations Commissions are created 
as enforcement organs. In this case, however, the intrinsic nature of acts which 
the Trade Union Law prohibits as unfair labor practices, and the procedure 
for securing the relief, are not necessarily . the same as those of the Wagner 
Act. The main object of this article is to make clear these points and to 
introduce the system of unfair labor practices in Japan.* 
                       II 
   The Japanese system of unfair labor practices was definitely established by 
* Regarding the U. S. system of unfair labor practices, refer to : Teller, Labor Disputes and 
Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, 1940; Rothenberg, on Labor Relations, 1949; Gregory, Labor and 
the Law, 1949; Millis and Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, 1950; Werne, The Law 
of Labor Relations, 1951.
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the enactment of the Trade Union Law in 1949. However, the old Trade 
Union Law of 1945 had a provision corresponding to Article 7 (1) of the 
Law of 1949 prohibiting unfair labor practices. That is to say, Article 11 of 
the Law of 1945 provided that (1) the employer shall not be allowed to 
discharge or give discriminatory treatment to a worker by reason of his being 
a member of a trade union, for his having tried to join or organize a trade 
union, or for his having performed proper acts of a trade union, and (2) 
the employer shall not be allowed to make it a condition of emloyment that 
the worker must not join or must withdraw from a trade union, and moreover 
Article 33 provided that in case of a violation of the said provision, such 
an emplyer shall be liable to be punished at the request of the Labor Relations 
Commission. These old provisions are often called a system of unfair labor 
practices. In truth, however, it is considered that they are not the direct reception 
of the American Law. 
   After World War I, in Japan, the establishment of the labor union law 
became a public opinion with the development of independent labor union 
movements. After all, the bills of the labor union law were often introduced 
into the Diet, but the labor union law was not actually enacted for many 
years. In 1925, the Department of Home Affairs made public a bill which 
included such provisions as the followings : "the employer or the agent shall be 
disallowed to discharge a worker by reason of his being a member of a trade 
union ", and " the employer or the agent shall be disallowed to make it a 
condition of employment that the worker must not join or must withdraw from 
a trade union". Moreover, the said bill had a punitive provision against 
a violator. As a matter of fact, however, when the bill was laid before the 
Diet by the government, the said punitive provision was deleted and it was 
simply declared that the discharge violated the law and a yellow dog contract 
should be void. 
   After World War II, the Trade Union Law became law in 1945 for the 
first time in Japan and the origin of this law can be traced back to the bills 
presented after 1920. The old Law of 1945, however, conditioned the request 
of the Labor Relations Commission for the punishment of a violator, and this 
point is believed to be referred to the American Law. 
   As explained above, the provisions themselves of the old Trade Union
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Law can be traced back to the bills presented after 1920. After the enforcement 
of this law, however, as it happened to be the occupation period, the Japanese 
law in general were greatly affected by the American law both in legislation 
or interpretation. Consequently, it was quite evident hat the above provisions of 
the old Trade Union Law were interpreted just the same as the unfair labor 
practices of the American Law, and moreover, that the function and manage-
ment of the Labor Relations Commission i Japan were considered always in 
comparison with those of the National Labor Relations Board in America. In 
1949, this tendency resulted in the total amendment of the Trade Union Law, 
in which the system of unfair labor practices modelling after the Wagner Act 
was established. Besides the discriminatory treament and a yellow dog contract 
which were prohibited by the old Law, the refusal of collective bargaining and 
control or interference with a labor union and financial support o it were 
prohibited as unfair labor practices. Moreover, the procedure to prevent 
violations of the Law was also changed from the principle of punishment by 
penalty to the remedial principle, the Labor Relations Commission being 
authorized to eradicate he effects of unfair labor practices ofan employer. Then, 
in 1952 when the occupation period came to an end, in amending the Trade 
Union Law, there were varied discussions about the system of unfair labor 
practices. The discussions finally ended only by adopting the provisions of the 
old Labor Relations Adjustment Law in the system of unfair labor practices 
   item 4 of Article 7 of the Trade Union Law. This Law of 1949 is now 
in existence. 
                       III 
   The system of unfair labor practices in Japan, as explained above, was 
established following the American Law. It is not proper, however, to consider 
that the substance of unfair labor practices is also copied from those of the 
American Law. 
   It was in 1935 when the system of unfair labor practices in America 
was first established in accordance with the Wagner Act. Its original form, 
however, could be traced back to the National Industrial Recovery Act of 
1933 (NIRA). The NIRA was the core law of the New Deal which was 
introduced by Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U. S. A., with the aim
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of overcoming that great financial crisis broken out at the end of 1929. Thus, 
the aim of this legislation was to prevent unfair competitions in the industry 
and to recover industrial activities by promoting cooperations between employers 
and employees and also among various enterprises. As a means of attaining 
these objects, code of fair competitions was required to be established in every 
industry. These codes were the regulations which stipulated the actual standards 
as to the working conditions and the methods of dealings, such as wages, 
working hours, limitation of production, price control, etc. It was so arranged 
that principally these codes were voluntarily set up by each industry and they 
had to be approved by the President. Naturally, these codes became the legal 
standards in each particular industry. In case when an employer violated any 
one of them, the matter was dealt as an unfair method of competition, just in 
the same manner as in the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. 
   With regard to the relations between labor and management, this code of 
fair competitions was required to contain the fundamental labor provisions of 
Sec. 7 (a) of the NIRA. This provisions of the NIRA were followed after 
Sec. 6 of the Clayton Act of 1914 and succeeded to the substance of Sec. 
2 of the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932. This provisions of the NIRA were 
the immediate back ground of the system of unfair labor practices. And in 
order to adjust industrial conflicts in the light of the provision, the National 
Labor Board, which was replaced in 1934 by the first National Labor Relations 
Board having stronger and wider authority, was created. The NIRA was a 
temporary legislation having the life of only two years' enforcement, but it was 
declared unconstitutional by the U. S. Supreme Court toward the end of its 
life of enforcement. Then, the Wagner Act became law in 1935. 
   The Wagner Act was enacted in order to give employees the bargaining 
power to bring about the equality between employees and employers by 
guaranteeing the right of employees to organize and to bargain collectively, 
wherein it was aimed to eliminate the causes of certain labor disputes burdening 
or obstructing the free flow of commerce. And for this purpose, the system 
of unfair labor practices was established. Unfair method of competition, set 
forth by the provisions of Section 7 (a) of NIRA, were prohibited as unfair 
labor practices ; the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was created to 
carry out the provisions of this Act and its procedures were provided by this
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Act. 
   As is explained above, the Wagner Act guarantees workers the right of 
organization to recover the equality of bargaining power between employers and 
employees, and excludes the practices which may bring the unequality of the 
bargaining power between them. While the violation by some employers of 
the right of employees to organize and to bargain collectively are considered 
as unfair competition between industries in the NIRA, such a violation was 
regraded as unfair competition between employees and employers in the 
Wagner Act. In this sense, therefore, the idea of unfair competition was 
enlarged herein. It may reasonably be said, however, that in America the 
unfair labor practices are essentially regarded as a kind of unfair competitions 
in labor relations. From this view-point, he problem of unfair labor practices 
by unions is logically open for discussion. Accordingly, the Taft-Hartley Act 
of 1947 (the Labor Management Relations Act) that is the amended Act of the 
Wagner Act, set forth unfair labor practices by unions as well as unfair labor 
practices by employers. 
   Different from this, Article 28 of the Constitution of Japan guarantees 
the right of workers to organize, to bargain and to act collectively. The 
guarantee of these rights, however, must always be made against he abuse 
of the national authority, and also against he illegal conduct of employers, 
because the workers' organization opposes to employers. For this purpose, the 
system of unfair labor practices have been adopted by the Trade Union Law. 
For this reason, the interference with the right of workers to organize and 
to bargain collectively is regarded as an unfair labor practice in Japan. From 
this view-point, unfair labor practices in Japan are considered only for these 
of employers, and the idea of. unfair labor practices by unions as in the 
Taft-Hartley Act is not considered proper, because it restricts in the exercise of 
the right of workers to organize. It is in this sense that there is a fundamental 
difference between the American Law and the Japanese Law. 
                       IV 
   Article 7 of the Trade Union Law prohibits to do the following acts on 
the part of the employer as unfair labor practices : 
   (1) " To discharge or give discriminatory treatment to a worker by
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reason of his being a member of a trade union, for his having tried to join or 
organize a trade union or his having performed proper acts of a trade union ;
or to make it a condition of employment that the worker must not join or 
must withdraw from a trade union." 
   Corresponding to subdivision 3 of Section 8 of the Wagner Act, this 
provision obviously purports to ban such acts as an infringement of the right 
of workers to organize, and it should be noted that the same conception, as 
already mentioned above, has been known also in Japan. Outstanding among 
the alleged unfair labor practices hould be mentioned such discriminatory 
treatment. While discriminatory treatment is usually interpreted like the case 
of the Wagner Act, the discrimination at the time of employing a new worker 
is not generally considered to constitute an unfair labor practice, for, different 
from the case of the Wagner Act, with subdivision 3 of Section 8, which 
provides : "by discrimination i regard to hire ... to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization," the Japanese Law fails to contain any 
specific provisions. In most cases, the labor unions in Japan are organized as 
company unions, and consequently, as a matter of fact, the problem is seldom 
taken up 'as an issue. However, in case a company is dissolved and all its 
employees are discharged, to be replaced by a new company, which proceeds to 
employ only those of the old employees who were not members of the labor 
union, explicitly for the purpose of evading the charge of acts in violation of 
the provision of item 1 of Article 7 of the Law, the Labor Relations 
Commissions take the stand that such constitutes an unfair labor practice of 
discrimination i  regard to discharge. 
   The case of " Yellow Dog Contrat " is seldom known in Japan. The proviso 
of item 1 of Article 7 of the Law provides : " Provided, however, that this 
shall not prevent an employer f om concluding a trade agreement with a trade 
union to require, as a condition of employment, that the workers must be 
members of the trade union if such trade union represents a majority of the 
workers in the particular plant or working place in which such workers are 
employed ", which, in effect, affirms that, in case a union represents a majority 
of workers, such will be recognized as either a closed shop contract or a union 
shop contract. In a majority of cases in Japan, however, a labor union is 
organized on the basis of the particular company, and, therefore, a closed shop
                  UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UNDER 7 
                  THE TRADE UNION LAW OF JAPAN 
contract is seldom concluded. 
   (2) "To refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of the 
workers employed by the employer without fair and appropriate r asons." 
   Item 2 of Article 7 corresponds to subdivision 5 of Section 8 of the Wagner 
Act. The Constitution of Japan guarantees the right of workers to bargain 
collectively by Article 28, and the Law fails to set forth the system of decision 
of the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining and designation 
of selection of representatives for such purposes, as is seen in Section 9 of the 
Wagner Act, and, as a consequence, all labor organizations (not necessarily 
required to be a labor union) will be entitled to bargain collectively. Repre-
sentatives of a labor union, or those to whom the powers are delegated by 
the labor union in accordance with the provision of Article 6 may act in the 
capacity of representatives for collective bargaining. Such persons, moreover, are 
not necessarily required to be employees mployed by the employer. 
   (3) "To control or interfere with the formationor management of a 
trade union by workers or to give financial support o it in defraying the trade 
union's operational expenditure." 
   Item 3 of Article 7 of the Law corresponds to subdivision 2 of Section 8 
of the. Wagner Act. Article 7 of the Labor Union Law lacks any general 
provisions, as seen in subdivision 1 of Section 8 of the Wagner Act, regarding 
unfair labor practices, and, consequently, the concept of control or interference 
with the formation or management ofa labor union is usually interpreted in a 
broader sense, so the employers who interfer with, restrain or coerce mployees 
in the exercise of the right of workers to organize and to bargain collectively 
are regarded to commit unfair labor practices. 
   The Japanese Law admits more exceptions regarding financial support 
extended to a labor union, as compared with the Wagner Act. The Law does 
not prevent the employer from permitting his employees to engage in a 
conference or negotiation with the employer during working hours without loss 
of time or pay. It is lawful, moreover, that the employer contributes towelfare 
funds or other similar funds, or furnishes the minimum office space. 
   (4) " To discharge or give discriminatory treatment to a worker for his 
having filed. a complaint with the Labor Relations Commission that the employer 
has violated the provisions of this Article ; for his having requested the Central
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Labor Relations Commission t  review the order issued under the provisions of 
Article 27 paragraph 4 ; or for his having presented evidence or having made 
testimony at the investigation or hearing conducted by the Labor Relations 
Commission n regard to such complaint or request orat the adjustment of 
labor disputes provided for in the Labor Relations Adjustment Law (Law No. 
25 of 1946)." 
   Item 4 of Article 7corresponds to subdivision 4 of Section 8 of the Wagner 
Act. This provision was newly added to the Law after it was amended in 
1952. To discharge or give other discriminatory reatment to a worker for his 
having made testimony at the adjustment of labor disputes was punishable 
under the old Labor Relations Adjustment Law. While no specific provision 
exists inregard to filing petition with the court or making testimony before the 
court, he Labor Relations Commissions regard such as an unfair labor practice 
which is a violation ofthe provision f item I of Article 7. 
V 
   The Trade Union Law provides that Labor Relations Commissions shall 
be set up to prevent unfair labor practices and prescribe remdies for workers. 
The Labor Relations Commition is often considered in reference to the NLRB 
of the Wagner Act or the Taft-Hartley Act, but the organization and functions 
of the Commission areentirely deferent from the NLRB. 
   (1) The Central Labor Relations Commission and Prefectural Labor 
Relations Commissions set up in each prefecture are empowered to adjust the 
labor elations ofprivate nterprises in general. Maritime labor elations, in 
view of special properties attending them, are adjusted bythe Mariners' Central 
Labor Relations. Commission and several Mariners' Local Labor Relations 
Commissions, the organization and functions of which are, in the main, the 
same with those of the Labor Relations Commissions mentioned above (Art. 19). 
   Besides, the Public Corporation and National Enterprise Labor Relations 
Law provided for the establishment of the Public Corporation a d National 
Enterprise Labor Relations Commission t  adjust the labor elations ofpublic 
corporations a dnational enterprises. 
   (2) The Labor Relations Commission s consisted of equal number of 
persons representing employers, workers and public interest. The Central Labor
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 Relations Commission comprises seven members each of such representatives, 
 while the Prefectural Labor Relations Commission consists of seven or five 
 members each. The members representing employer in accordance with the 
 recommendations f the employers' organizations, the members epresenting labor 
 with the recommendations f labor unions and the members representing public 
 interest with the agreement of the members representing of both employer and 
 labor are appointed either by the Labor Minister in case of the Central Labor 
 Relations Commission, or by the prefectural governor in case of the Prefectural 
 Labor Relations Commission. The term of office of each memberis one year, 
 and the members may be re-appointed. 
     In each of these Commissions, an Executive Office is established to handle 
 the administrative affairs of the Commission. 
     (3) The Central Labor Relations Commission and each of Prefectural 
 Labor Relations Commissions are placed under the jurisdiction of the Labor 
 Minister and the prefectural governor concerned, but each of the Commissions 
 performs independently its functions. 
     The powers grantedto the Commission is devided into two main parts. 
 One is the functions of adjustment including conciliation, mediation and 
 arbitration of labor disputes under the provisions of the Labor Relations 
 Adjustment Law, while the other is the quasi-judicial functions, which include 
 the inquiry whether or not a labor union in question fills the conditions provided 
 ,in Article 2 and paragraph 2, Article 5 of the Labor Union Law (Para. 1 of 
 Art. 5, Art. 11), the resolution on the general regional binding force of a 
 collective bargaining agreement (Art. 18), and the inquiry into and remedying 
 of the unfair labor practices (Art. 27). Such quasi-judicial functions are 
 performed only by the members epresenting public interest of the Commission. 
 (Art. 24). 
     As far as the functions of adjustment are concerned, the Central Labor 
 Relations Commission and Prefectural Labor Relations Commissions stand on 
 the same footing, with the only difference in their jurisdiction, while, in regard 
 to their quasi-judicial functions, the Central Labor Relations Commission isvested 
 with the power to review the adjudications of the Prefectural Labor Relations 
 Commission (Art. 25). Besides, the Central Labor Relations Commission is
 empowered to formulate and promulgate rules of procedures for the Labor
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Relations Commissions (Art. 26) as well as to state the opinion about the 
emergency adjustment according to the provisions of Chapter IV-2 of the 
Labor Relations Adjustment Law. 
                      VI
   In case an employer violates the provisions of Article 7 of the Trade Union 
Law, for instance, in case he dischages a worker in violation of the provision 
of item 1, Article 7 of the Law, the worker may file a petition with the court 
to assert the invalidity of such discharge (Para. 11 of Art. 27), while he may 
file a complaint with the Labor Relations Commission through the following 
procedure. 
   (1) Jurisdiction 
   The Prefectural Labor Relations Commission with jurisdiction over the 
domicle, or the locality of the main office, of the worker, labor union, or of 
the employer, who is the party of the unfair labor practice, or the Prefectural 
Labor Relations Commission with jurisdiction over the area where the unfair 
labor practice was done, will be able to deal with the matter. When a case of 
unfair labor practice is pending at two or more Commissions, the case will be 
dealt with by the Commission which accepted the complaint first, while in such 
a case the Central Labor Relations Commission may designate any other 
Commission having jurisdiction to deal with it. When two or more cases of 
unfair labor practice related to each other are separately pending at two or 
more Commissions, the Central Labor Relations Commission, if necessary, may 
designate one Commission having jurisdiction to deal with it. If the case is 
deemed to be of national importance, the Central Labor Relations Commission 
itself may deal with it or designate one of the Commissions concerned to deal 
with it (Art. 27 and 28 of the Enforcement Order of Trade Union Law). 
   (2) Filing Complaint 
   While the Trade Union Law is provided with no specific provision on who 
may file a complaint, it is generally held that the worker and labor union 
directly affected by alleged unfair labor practices are naturally vested with the 
right to file complaint. Although a complaint will be made in a written form 
covering certain fixed items, an oral complaint may also be allowable (Art. 32 
of the Rule of Central Labor Relations Commission). A complaint is required
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to be filed within a year from the date an unfair labor practice is committed 
(or as for such practice as continues, from the date of its termination) (Para. 2 
of Art. 27). In filing a complaint, the labor union is required to prove that it 
is in compliance with the provisions of Article 2 and paragraph 2, Article 5 of 
the Trade Union Law (Para. 1, Art. 5). 
   (3) Investigation a d Hearing 
    Whenever a complaintisfiled that an employer has violated the provision 
of Article 7 with a Labor Relations Commission, theLabor Relations Commission 
shall make an immediate investigation a d shall have a hearing of the issues 
on the merits of the complaint. Such hearing shall be made public in the 
presence of the parties concerned. And at such hearing, sufficient opportunity 
to present evidence and cross-examine th witnesses shall be given to the 
employer concerned aswell as the complainants (Para. I and 3 of Art. 27 of 
the Law, Art. 40 of the Rule). The hearing will be conducted by the members 
representing public interest, although those members epresenting labor or 
employer may also be allowed to participate (Art. 24 of the Trade Union Law). 
At the conclusion f the hearing, a conference by the members epresenting 
public interest will decide whether or not an unfair labor practice has been 
committed. Prior to such conference, however, the opinions of the labor and 
employer members who have participated in hearings must be asked (Art. 42 
of the Rule). 
    In the course of investigation a d hearing, the chairman of the Commission, 
whenever such is deemed proper and appropriate, may advise both parties of 
labor and employer to settle the case. The case terminates with the conclusion 
of such conciliation (Art. 38 of the Rule). 
   (4) Order 
   In case it is adjudged after investigation and hearing that an unfair labor 
practice has been committed, an order granting a 'relief will be issued by the 
Commision, while, in case the complaint is adjudged groundless, an order 
dismissing the complaint will be issued (Para. 4, Art. 27 of the Trade Union 
Law, Art. 43 and 44 of the Rule). And, in case the complaint isconsidered to 
fall under the provisions of Article 34 of the Rule, a decision refusing to 
accept the complaint will be made. The order will be in a written form, copies 
Qf which are served on the employer concerned and the complainants, The
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order is in full force and effect from the date of service, which, however, does 
not mean that it is immediately vested with a compulsory binding force (Para. 
4, Art. 27 of the Trade Union Law). 
   While, with regard to the substance of relief granted by the Commission, 
the Trade Union Law fails to provide for a general principle as seen in Section 
10 (c) of the Wagner Act, it is generally understood that the employer will 
be directed to take effective steps to eradicate the effects of particular illegal 
acts, such as reinstatement with or without back pay, posting notices, etc. In 
case of such unfair labor practices as refusal of collective bargaining, domination 
or interference with union activity, the employer will be directed to cease and 
desist from these acts because they are liable to be repeated in future. In such 
a case, a cease and desist order may be issued regarding a specific act in relation 
to the past acts, while no broad and general cease and desist order may be 
issued. 
   In filing a complaint in a written form, the subtance of the remedy must 
be described by a complainant (item 4, Paragraph 2, Article 32 of the Rule). 
It is doubtful, in this connection, if the remedy to be granted by the Commission 
is allowed to go beyond the remedy in complaint. Paragraph 4, Article 27 of 
the Trade Union Law provides that the Labor Relations Commission must issue 
an order granting in full or in part the relief sought by the complainant. The 
remedy of unfair labor practices, however, is effective if it is granted elastically 
in accordance with the nature of illegal acts committed, and, thus, it is evident 
that the relief granted by the Commission may not necessarily be confined within 
the remedy sought by the complainant, but should be adapted to the illegal 
acts committed so far as it does not run counter to the meaning of the complaint. 
   (5) Review by the Central Labor Relations Commission 
   The employer, the worker or the labor union dissatisfied with the order 
issued by a Prefectural Labor Relations Commission may file a request for review 
by the Central Labor Relations Commission within fifteen days from the date 
of service (Para. 5 and 11, Art. 27 of the Trade Union Law, Para. 3, Art. 51 
of the Rule). The Central Labor Relations Commission is empowered to initiate 
such review (Para. 2, Art. 25 of the Trade Union Law). Even after a request 
for review has been filed, the order issued by the Prefectural Labor Relations 
Commission remains in force, In the review, the Central Labor Relations
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Commission may take an independent stand to conduct investigation a d hearing 
and make a finding of fact. As a result of review, the Commission may reverse 
or modify the order issued by the Prefectural Labor Relations Commission, or 
dismiss the request to support the order. 
   (6) Administrative Suit 
   The employer, in case he does not elect o request a review by the Central 
Labor Relations Commission, or in case he receives an order or other decision 
from the Central Labor Relations Commission, may file his petition according 
to the provisions of the Exceptional Law for Administrative Suit Cases within 
thirty days from the date of service of such order or decision (Para. 6 and 8 
of the Trade Union Law). Opinion differs on whether a worker or a labor 
union may likewise file such a petition. The court has held that such is possible, 
but that the petition may be filed by a worker or a labor union only after 
undergoing the review by the Central Labor Relations Commission. 
   When the employer files a petition, the court mayjudge not only on the 
lawfulness of the procedures taken by the Labor Relations Commission but also 
on the contents of the order issued. Nor will it be bound by the findings of 
fact made by the Commission. 
   In case the employer files such a petition with the court, a considerable 
period of time will be needed before a judgement is fixed, and such will be 
only too liable to deprive the remedy granted by the Commission of its efficacy, 
so the court, with which the petition is filed, may issue, on appeal from the 
Commission concerned, an emergency order requiring the employer concerned 
to comply in full or in a part with the order of the said Commission pending 
final judgement by the court (Para. 7, Art. 27 of the Trade Union Law). In 
case an employer has violated this order, he will be liable to a fine (Art. 32). 
   (7) Ensuring of the Remedy 
   While the order issuedby a Labor Relations Commission is not in itself 
vested with a binding force, in following two cases the order is fixed and its 
efficacy is ensured with punishment : 
   (i) In case all or a part of an order issued by a Commission has been 
sustained by the fixed judgement of the court, its violator will be liable to 
imprisonment ot exceeding one year or to a fine not exceeding 100,000 yen 
or to both (Art. 28 of the Trade Union Law).
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   (ii) In case the employer fails to file an administrative suit within the 
presribed period, the order issued by the Commission will be fixed, violator of 
which will be liable to a fine not exceeding 100,000 yen (Art. 32 of the Labor 
Union Law).
